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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v ..JOSEPH LYLE
STONER, Defendant and Respondent.
[1] Oriminal Law - Evidence Resulting From Evidence illegally
Obtained: Oonfessions.-The confession of one accused of robbery was not sufficiently an act of free will to purge the
primary taint of an illegal search and seizure six days earlier
in his hotel room, and must be excluded, under the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine, where there was no break in the
chain between the two events, where for the three days between
his arrest and his confession and arraignment the investigating
officers used the items illegally seized to induce him to confess,
where he was told that his room had been searched, that they
had found incriminating evidence there, where during this
period he talked with none of his relatives, and received no
legal advice, and where the }'ecord did not show that prior
to the confession he had been told of his right to remain silent.
[2] ld. - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure - Evidence Not
Within Rule-Identification.-The rights of the accused as to
an independent courtroom identification by an eyewitness, following an identification by the same witness in a showup
tainted by the product of an illegal search and seizure, are
adequately protected when the witness takes the stand in open
cpurt, for examination and cross-examination, even though it
may be impossible for him to forget a significant perception
and to prevent stored remembrances from subconsciously
affecting hi$ later perceptions and decisions.
[3] ld.-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure-Evidence Not
Within Rule-Identi1ication.-The courtroom identification by
an eyewitness of one accused of robbery, although partly
dependent on a viewing at an earlier showup identification, in
which the accused was made to wear horn-rimmed glasses and
- a gray sweater taken from his room in an illegal search and
seizure, was sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint, where the items illegal1y taken were not admitted into evidence, where the eyewitness, before the showup,
had tentatively identified him from a photograph, Rnd at a
hearing at the trial outside the presence of the jury stated that
on the night of the crime the accused had stood close to him
for five minutes and spoken several times, and that at this and

[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed
§ 401).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 413.5(7), 467(3),
467(4); [2-4] Criminal Law, § 413.5(6).
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at other courtroom appearances he recognized him not only by
sight but also from his soft and controlled voice.
[4] Id.-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure-Evidence Not
Within Rule-IdentUication.-A showup identi1ication by an
eyewitness of the accused would be admissible at the trial,
despite the ,accused having been made to wear glasses and
clothing obtained by an illegal search and seizure, if the pros~
cution were to prove that the identification had Dot been
a1Iected thereby, for example, that the police had been told
what the accused was wearing at the time of the crime and had
followed the usual procedure of dressing up everyone at the
showup in similar fashion, so that the accused, whether or not
the items actually worn at the crime were available, would
have been observed under virtually identical conditions.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. David W. Williams, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for robbery. Judgment of conviction of first degree robbery reversed.
Robert L. Kern, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Defendant and Respondent.
Thomas . C~· Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and David S. Sperber, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant's conviction of robbery in the
first degree (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 211a) was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court on the ground that illegally
seized evidence was admitted at his trial. (Stoner v. Oaltilornia, 376 U.S. 483 [11L.Ed.2d 856, 84 8.0t. 889].) Uponretrial, defendant was again convicted of robbery in the first
degree. He appeals from the judgment.
At 8 p.m. on October 25, 1960, two men, one with a gun,
entered the Budget Town Market in Monrovia and ordered
David Greeley, a clerk at the checkout counter, to put the
money from the cash register in a paper bag. They forced
Greeley and another clerk to lie on the floor and then lef~.
When the police arrived, Greeley told them that the man with
the gun was wearing a gray sweater or jacket, gray pants, a
gray shirt, a gray work hat, and horn-rimmed glasses, and was
holding a gray .45 caliber automatic.
The day after the robbery, a person who lived next door to
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the Budget Town Market found a checkbook in her yard,
which she gave to the manager of the market, who in turn gave
it to the police. Using the account number printed on the
checks, the investigating officers obtained defendant's name
and discovered that he had previously been convicted uf murder and robbery. They showed a photograph of defendant to
the clerks at the store and received a tentative identification
of him as the man who had held the gun. The officers then
went to the Mayfair Hotel where they believed defendant was
staying. When the night clerk told them that defendant must
be out because his room key was in his mailbox, the officers
explained that they were trying to find defendant to arrest
him on suspicion of robbery and asked permission to enter his
room. The clerk took the officers to the room, unlocked the
door and admitted them. The officers searched the room and
found a pair of horn-rimmed glasses, several gray sweaters
and jackets, and a gray .45 caliber automatic.
On Saturday, October 29, defendant was arrested in Las
Vegas and waived extradition. Although the investigating
officers from Monrovia arrived in Las Vegas on Saturday
night, they did not begin the return trip immediately because
they wished to determine whether defendant's confederate was
also in town. On Monday, October 31, the officers brought
defendant to California. At his request, they stopped ir.
Pomona so that he might talk to his parole officer. They then
took him to the Temple City jail where he spent the night.
On Tuesday morning defendant appeared in a showup and
was told to put on the glasses, a sweater that had been taken
from his room, and a hat. Greeley identified him at this time
as the robber who had held the gun. Later that morning the
investigating officers interrogated defendant and obtained an
oral confession. Shortly after noon he was brought before a
magistrate and arraigned.
At defendant's first trial, the various items taken from his
hotel room were introduced into evidence. The Supreme Court
of the United States reversed the judgment of conviction, holding that these items were inadmissible on the ground that the
police had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution when they searched defendant's room. At defendant's second trial, the prosecution did
not introduce any of the items that the police found in defendant's hotel room. It relied primarily on defendant's oral confession and Greeley's courtroom identification. Defendant took
the stand and denied that he had committed the robbery. His
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former sister-in-law testified that defendant was at her house
at 8 p.m. on the night of October 25, 1960.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting
theconfcssion into evidence on the ground that it is a product
of the illegal search and seizure and was therefore "a fruit
of the poisonous tree." (Nardone v. United States, 308 'O'.S.
338, 341 [84 L.Ed. 307, 60 8.Ct. 266] ; see Silverthor-ne Lum.
ber 00. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-392 [64 L.Ed. 319, .
40 8.Ct. 182, 24 A.L.R. 1426].)
In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 475 [9 L.Ed.2d
441, 83 S.Ct. 407], the United States Supreme Court considered statements of a defendant made after the police had·
unlawfully entered his home and illegally arrested him. It
held that once the "verbal evidence . . . derives so immediately" from the misconduct, it must be excluded. This court
has excluded extrajudicial statements of the victim of an
illcgal search and seizure when it appeared that the statements
were induced or impelled by the unlawful acts. (People v.
Bilderback, 62 Ca1.2d 757, 768 [44 Cal. Rptr. 313, 401 P.2d
921] ; see People v. Dixon, 46 Cal.2d 456, 458 [296 P.2d 557] ;
People v. Macias, 180 Cal.App.2d 193, 197-198 [4 Cal. Rptr.
256].) In other jurisdictions extrajudicial statements are excluded when they are "the product" of (People v. Rodriguez,
11 N.Y.2d 279, 286 [183 N.E.2d 65~, 653, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353,
357]) or "obtained under the compulsion of the things seized"
(Takahashi v. United States (9th Cir.) 143 F.2d 118, 122; see
Oommonwealth v. Spofford, 343 Mass. 703, 707-708 [180
N.E.2d 673, 676] ; People v. Bilderback, supra, at pp. 767-768;
Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and
Hope (1963) 42 Neb.L.Rev. 483, 548).
Although there is conflicting testimony as to the details of
what occurred between the time of defendant's arrest and his
(>onfession, the uncontradicted facts (see People v. Trout, 54
Ca1.2d 576, 583 [6 Cal.Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231, 80 A.L.R.2d
1418] ; People v. Berve, 51 Ca1.2d 286, 290 [332 P.2d 97])
compel exclusion of the confession as a fruit of the illegal
search and seizure. Officer Collins, one of the investigating
officers from Monrovia, testified that when he and his partner
arrived in Las Vegas, they told defendant that he was suspected of robbing the Budget Town Market and that his room
at the Mayfair Hotel had been entered. The officer recalled
that they told defendant their reasons for accusing him of the
crime but he could not remember whether they had specifically
informed defendant that a gun, eyeglasses, and clothing sim-
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ilar to those seen by witnesses to the robbery had been taken
from defendaut's room and that he hau. b('en tentatively
identified as one of the robbers from his photograph. It WClS
"possible" that they "might have" mentioned all these details
to their prisoner. Either in Las Vegas or on the trip back to
Monrovia, defendant told the officers that he wished to talk
to his parole officer in Pomona. The officers called ahead to
make an appointment. Defendant and his parole officer met
in the Pomona jail on lIonday afternoon and discussed the
possibility that defendant's parole would be revoked because
a gun had been found in his room. Upon leaving the jail, the
parole officer told the -investigating officers that defendant
should have time to think since he was considering whether or
not to make various admissions.
Sometime on Monday, defendant requested permission to
telephone his wife. According to defendant, the officers told
him that he could not telephone anyone and especially not his
wife. When he repeated his request, they told him that he
could talk with his relatives after he confessed. Officer Collins
testified that he told defendant that he preferred that defendant not telephone his wife since she might alert his confederate
in the crime and that at no time did he forbid defendant from
making a telephone call although he certainly wished to keep
him out of contact with the outside world so that defendant
could think about making a confession. On Monday night,
defendant's wife telephoned the police station. An officer told
her that the Temple City jail had no facilities for visiting
with the prisoners and that she could talk to her husband at
the arraignment on the following day.
On Tuesday morning, at an interrogation that followed the
showup, defendant confessed to having participated in the
robbery. He testified that before he confessed the officers
showed him bis gun and glasses and told him tbat if he confessed no charges would be pressed and he would be returned
to prison only for violating the conditions of his parole. Officer
Collins testified that no promises were made and that defendant was shown the gun and glasses only after he admitted
robbing the Budget Town Market. Defendant was told, however, that the police had taken a gun from his room.
[1] It appears that from the time defendant was arrested
in Las Vegas until he confessed, the investigating officers
used the items they had illegally seized to induce him to con- _
fess. In Las Vegas, he was told that his room in the Mayfair
Hotel had been searched. He learned from the investigating

600

PEOPLE V. STONER

[650.2d

officers that incriminating evidence had been found there.
By the time he had talked with his parole officer, he knew that
the police had his gun. At the showup, if not before, he discovered that his glasses and sweater had been seized. From
the time that he was arrested in Las Vegas until the time he
was arraigned, he talked with none of his relatives and received no legal advice. l During this 72-hour period, defendant
saw only police officers, his parole officer, and perhaps some
other prisoners. Finally, the record does not show that defendant was informed, at any time before he confessed, that he
had a right to remain silent.
Under these circumstances there was no break in the chain
between the illegal search and seizure and defendant's confession. It was not" sufficiently an act of free will to purge the
primary taint. " (Wong Sun v. United States, supra, at p. 486;
see Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 90-91 [11 L.Ed.2d 171,
84 S.Ct.. 229].)
Since the confession was inadmissible under the rule of
Wong Sun v. United States, supra, 371 U.S. 471, 475, as fruit
of the poisonous tree, we need not consider defendant's contentions that it was involuntary and also inadmissible under
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 8.0t.
1758], an~ People v. Dorado, 62 Oa1.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169,
398 P.2d 361]. Although the judgment must be reversed because of the error in admitting defendant's confession, he
raises a subsidiary issue that may arise on retrial.
Defendant contends that Greeley's courtroom identification
must also be excluded as a fruit of the poisonous tree on the
ground that Greeley was able to identify him at the showup
only because he wore the illegally seized clothing and could
not have identified him at the trial had he not identified him
at the showup.
Before Greeley identified defendant at the trial, the court
conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether Greeley's courtroom identification would be dependent upon his identification at the showup. Greeley stated
that on the night of the robbery defendant stood at the checkout counter for approximately five minutes and spoke several
times. When Greeley compared his perceptions from watchtOfficer Collins testified that in Las Vegaa defendant asked for an
attorney. When the officer asked who defendant's attorney was and how
he might be reached, defendant changed his mind and said that he wished
to talk to his parole officer. Defendant testified that he could not rememher whether or not he asked for an attorney but that he was quite aure
the officers never offered to call one for him.

)
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ing and listening to defendant in this and other courtroom
appearances with his recollections of the night of the robbery,
he was sure defendant was one of the robbers. "I mean you
don't forget a person you are facing right on, whether having
glasses on or a hat, or whatever they do have on, and his
demeanor. He is quiet. He doesn't seem excitable and he is
the same way he talked through-all the time. I think I would
recognize him right off any time." .Again, when asked what
made his remembrance so clear, Greeley replied, "probably
more his demeanor than anything because he is quite calm, and
when I talked to him, as I say, I think I recognized his voice
as the same soft and controlled voice." The trial court ruled
that the witness' courtroom identification would be sufficiently
independent of his showup identification to be admissible.
Defendant contends that regardless of how honestly and
strongly an eyewitness to a crime may believe that his courtroom identification is not affected by an earlier tainted showup
identification, it should be held as a matter of law that once
a witness has made a tainted identification of the accused,
he must be disqualified from ever making a subsequent courtroom identification, for he cannot clear ,his mind of earlier
impressions. No cases have carried the f~uit-of-the-poisonous
tree doctrine this far. 2
[2] The federal courts have held that an eyewitness who
has made an identification of the accused while the latter was
being unlawfully detained following a lawful arrest is not precluded from making a subsequent independent courtroom identification. (See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States (8th Cir.) 356 F.
2In a recent federal ease, a majority of the eourt held that a eourtroom
identifieation was tainted by a previous view of the defendant by the witness in an illegal showup and therefore should not have been allowed.
(Wade v. United State8 (5th Cir.) 358 F.2d 557, eert. granted 385
U.S. 811 [17 L.Ed.2d 53, 87 S.Ct. 81].) It did not hold, however,
that a tainted identifieation foreeloses any later identification freed of
the taint, but earefully eonsiderecl all the surrounding eircumstances and
coneluded that in the partieular situation the eourtroom identification
was irremediably tainted by the earlier illegal showup. In two other federal eases, dissenting judges arrived at the same eonelusion on the facts
before them but stated that the pivotal problem is the actual effect of
the tainted identifieation on the courtroom identification. (Gilbert v.
United State8 (9th Cir.) 366 F.2d 923, 951, dissenting opinion of Browning, J.; United State8 ex reI. Stovall v. Denno (2d Cir.) 355 F.2d 731,
742, dissenting opinion of Friendly, Waterman and Smith, JJ., cort.
granted 384 U.S. 1000 [16 L.Ed.2d 1014, 86 S.Ct. 1983].) In Gilbert,
Judge Browning based his dissent on the fact that the trial judge did
not make the necessary factual determination. The majority rejected the
idea that a witness eould ever be tainted. In Denno, the dissenting judges
found prejudiee because the jury was told about the tainted identifieation.
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2d 685; Edwards v. United States (D.C. Cir.) 330 F.2d 849.)
As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently
noted: "The consequence of accepting appellant's contention
in the present situation would be that . . . [the witness]
would be forever precluded from testifying against . . . [the
defendant] in court, merely because he had complied with the
request of the police that he come to police headquarters and
had there identified . . . [the defendant] as the robber. Such
a result is unthinkable. . . . The rights of the accused in a
case like the present are adequately protected when the complaining witness takes the stand in open court, for examination and cross-examination." (Payne v. United States, 294
F.2d 723, 727, cert. den. 368 U.S. 883 [7 L.Ed.2d 83, 82 S.Ct.
131].) In Monroe v. United States (D.C. Cir.) 234 F.2d 49
[98 App. D.C. 228], cert. den. 352 U.S. 873 [1 L.Ed.2d 76,
77 S.Ct. 94], it was held that the recipient of a telephone call
could testify as to what he had heard although in the interim
he had listened to an inadmissible tape recording of the same
conversation. In Warren v. Territory of Hawaii, 119 F.2d
936, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit permitted
witnesses to testify on the basis of independent recollections
even though their testimony reiterated statements they had
previously made to the police when confronted with evidence
that the court assumed had been illegally seized.
Thus, thc fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine has not been
invoked when the alleged fruit is testimony of a witness to a
crime whose identity was not learned through police misconduct. (See Payne v. United States, supra, at p. 727.)
Although it may be impossible for a person to forget a significant perception and to prevent stored remembrances from
subconsciously affecting his later perceptions and decisions
(see Bartlett, Remembering (1961) pp. 186-214; Cameron,
Remembering (1947) p. 78; 5 Freud, Collected Papers
(Strachey ed., 1950) pp. 175-180), it does not follow that the
testimony of a person in Greeley's position should be excluded. [3], [4] [See fn. 3.] Even if Greeley's courtroom
identification was dependent in part on his viewing defendant
in illegally obtained clothing at the showup, it was" 'sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' "
(Wong Sun v. United States, S1tpra, at p. 488, quoting
J. Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959) p. 221.)3
3In considering the admissibility of Greeley's courtroom identification,
wo have assumed that the trial court correctly excluded Greeley's showup
identification on the ground that it was tainted by the use of defendant's
illegally seized glasses and clothing. The showup identification would be

"
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Since other questions raised are not likely to arise on retrial, we need not consider them here.
The judgment is reversed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., Sullivan, J.,
and Roth, J. pro tem.,· concurred.

